How do we know if something exists? Does it need to have some physical form? If not, then how do we know if it exists? Notice how we went full circle on that initial question? We're not alone, as mathematicians and philosophers have discussed and debated on the nature of the most fundamental thing in the universe: numbers.
You can take this question as an intellectual exercise, though this topic can be discussed seriously in some academic circles. |
"All mathematicians live in two different worlds. They live in a crystalline world of perfect platonic forms. But they also live in the common world where things are transient, ambiguous, subject to vicissitudes. Mathematicians go backward and forward from one world to another. They're adults in the crystalline world, infants in the real one."
Sylvain Cappell
You might have an immediate gut reaction to the given question. But then, you can’t pick up the number 3 and throw it through a window. By intuition the only things that exist are the kinds of things that can be physically manipulated, and numbers, by almost every account, just aren’t this kind of thing.
To be clear about our terms, you can pick up numerals — that is, you can pick up concrete instances of numbers, like the number signs at the petrol station telling you how much it costs, or the printed numerals in a book, denoting page numbers. But you don’t, by virtue of tearing out page three of a book and tossing it out a window, throw the number 3 out the window, any more than you throw a person out of a window by drawing a picture of him/her and throwing that out the window.
Numbers, if they exist, are generally what philosophers call “abstract objects”, and those who maintain that such things exist claim that they exist outside of space and time. You may say “Outside of space and time? What does that even mean? Gibberish!” If you are so disposed, you might be what philosophers call a “nominalist”, and you are part of a long, proud philosophical tradition that thinks that existence is the exclusive domain of the physical.
However, your nominalism begins to run into problems pretty quickly. Never mind numbers. What about things like, say, novels? What exactly is a novel? It’s not any of the particular instantiations of it — it’s not the copy on your bookshelf; it’s not the copy on anyone’s. All of the print copies on the planet could be eradicated and still the novel could be able to be said to exist. Is the novel the original manuscript sitting in a safe somewhere? But that could be burned and you could still argue that the novel exists. But if the novel itself is not identified with any of its particular instantiations, then the nominalist is in a bit of a quandary. On this perspective, the copies of the novel are instantiations of the novel itself, and the novel itself is seeming to be something abstract — something non-physical.
So the idea of something somehow existing outside space and time is suddenly not as absurd as it may have seemed. What about numbers, then? Of course there are disanalogies between numbers and novels. Novels are invented by humans, while, on most views of the subject, numbers exist whether or not humans ever happened to discover them – or even exist in the first place. But, putting such differences aside for the moment, perhaps the existence of novels as abstract objects gives us some traction to say that numbers exist as abstract objects.
To be clear about our terms, you can pick up numerals — that is, you can pick up concrete instances of numbers, like the number signs at the petrol station telling you how much it costs, or the printed numerals in a book, denoting page numbers. But you don’t, by virtue of tearing out page three of a book and tossing it out a window, throw the number 3 out the window, any more than you throw a person out of a window by drawing a picture of him/her and throwing that out the window.
Numbers, if they exist, are generally what philosophers call “abstract objects”, and those who maintain that such things exist claim that they exist outside of space and time. You may say “Outside of space and time? What does that even mean? Gibberish!” If you are so disposed, you might be what philosophers call a “nominalist”, and you are part of a long, proud philosophical tradition that thinks that existence is the exclusive domain of the physical.
However, your nominalism begins to run into problems pretty quickly. Never mind numbers. What about things like, say, novels? What exactly is a novel? It’s not any of the particular instantiations of it — it’s not the copy on your bookshelf; it’s not the copy on anyone’s. All of the print copies on the planet could be eradicated and still the novel could be able to be said to exist. Is the novel the original manuscript sitting in a safe somewhere? But that could be burned and you could still argue that the novel exists. But if the novel itself is not identified with any of its particular instantiations, then the nominalist is in a bit of a quandary. On this perspective, the copies of the novel are instantiations of the novel itself, and the novel itself is seeming to be something abstract — something non-physical.
So the idea of something somehow existing outside space and time is suddenly not as absurd as it may have seemed. What about numbers, then? Of course there are disanalogies between numbers and novels. Novels are invented by humans, while, on most views of the subject, numbers exist whether or not humans ever happened to discover them – or even exist in the first place. But, putting such differences aside for the moment, perhaps the existence of novels as abstract objects gives us some traction to say that numbers exist as abstract objects.
Abstract objects
What other sorts of things could be included in the category of abstract objects? The funny thing is that in many seminal texts on the subject, one has to plumb deep to find mention of what would count as an abstract object. Mathematical objects generally top the list (numbers, points, lines, triangles, etc.), followed by things like chess moves, games in general, pieces of music, and propositions. How are these things abstract? We generally think of a chess move, for instance, as something that exists by virtue of a concrete chess player actually moving a concrete chess piece in accordance with the rules of the game (which could themselves be considered abstract, but never mind this for the moment). But that seemingly concrete move can be instantiated in so many concrete ways — you could be replicating someone else’s game on your own chess board, you could make the move on a hundred different boards all at (nearly) the same time, you could make the move in your head before you make it on the board, and all of these concrete possibilities point to the problem here: If you believe there is only one move, and it’s concrete, then which move is the one move? And then what are the other moves? Copies of the move? Or instantiations of the same move? If you believe in abstract objects, you have, on some takes, an easier time of it. The move itself is an abstract object, and every physical version of that move is a concrete instantiation of that move. That is, none of the concrete, physical moves are actually the move — there is only one move and it is abstract, and any physical move is a copy, like a sculpture of a real person. (You can have a thousand sculptures of a person, but there’s only one person. The sculptures are imitations of the person.) |
This perspective is called platonism, named after Plato’s idea that there are ideal “forms” — perfect archetypes of which objects in the real world are imperfect copies.
Why would these ideal forms not exist in space-time? Why would they have to be abstract? Well, objects in space-time (the real world) are all imperfect copies of something. So if an ideal form existed in, say, your living room, then it would be non-ideal by virtue of existing in your living room. To put it in another way, if, say a chess move were instantiated in a thousand ways, how would you pick out the ideal version from which all others were copied? All of the instantiations would have similar properties, and so no one instantiation would stand out as different enough to count as the move, the platonic form of that move. Therefore, it makes sense to posit an abstract version of the move — something perfect, and outside of space-time, from which all the worldly versions are copied.
Thinking about geometric objects is perhaps the clearest way to think about abstract objects. A line segment (a true, geometric line segment) is a perfectly straight, one-dimensional object with a determinate length. There are no such objects in space-time. Every object you could possibly interact with is three-dimensional — no matter how thin a piece of, say, plastic you create, it always has a height and a thickness, giving it three dimensions. Nothing, therefore, in the concrete world, is a real geometric line segment. We have things that approximate line segments — very straight, very thin objects, like a graphite line made with a ruler and pencil. But none of those things will ever be perfectly straight and with zero thickness. So if there does, somehow, exist a true line segment, it certainly isn’t in the concrete world, and therefore it must be in some sort of abstract realm.
Knowledge of abstract objects
One of the most damning aspects of platonism is its failure to come to terms with how we learn things about abstract objects. The general picture of how we acquire knowledge goes something like this: We perceive an object in the physical world, via physical means (e.g., light bounces off the physical object and hits our eyes), and eventually we process such perceptions in our brains and work with mental representations — i.e., brain states — of the object in question. But an abstract object can’t be processed like this. It is non-physical, and so, e.g., light can’t reflect off of it. So our usual causal theory of knowledge acquisition fails for things like numbers.
Well, then, how is it that we come across any knowledge of abstract objects, if they indeed exist? Some mathematical platonists, like the venerable logician Kurt Gödel, resorted to the idea that we just know truths about mathematical abstracts. As he wrote:
"But, despite their remoteness from sense experience, we do have a perception also of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don’t see why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e., in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception…"
Worries like this keep nominalists well-motivated to stay on their side of the debate.
Why would these ideal forms not exist in space-time? Why would they have to be abstract? Well, objects in space-time (the real world) are all imperfect copies of something. So if an ideal form existed in, say, your living room, then it would be non-ideal by virtue of existing in your living room. To put it in another way, if, say a chess move were instantiated in a thousand ways, how would you pick out the ideal version from which all others were copied? All of the instantiations would have similar properties, and so no one instantiation would stand out as different enough to count as the move, the platonic form of that move. Therefore, it makes sense to posit an abstract version of the move — something perfect, and outside of space-time, from which all the worldly versions are copied.
Thinking about geometric objects is perhaps the clearest way to think about abstract objects. A line segment (a true, geometric line segment) is a perfectly straight, one-dimensional object with a determinate length. There are no such objects in space-time. Every object you could possibly interact with is three-dimensional — no matter how thin a piece of, say, plastic you create, it always has a height and a thickness, giving it three dimensions. Nothing, therefore, in the concrete world, is a real geometric line segment. We have things that approximate line segments — very straight, very thin objects, like a graphite line made with a ruler and pencil. But none of those things will ever be perfectly straight and with zero thickness. So if there does, somehow, exist a true line segment, it certainly isn’t in the concrete world, and therefore it must be in some sort of abstract realm.
Knowledge of abstract objects
One of the most damning aspects of platonism is its failure to come to terms with how we learn things about abstract objects. The general picture of how we acquire knowledge goes something like this: We perceive an object in the physical world, via physical means (e.g., light bounces off the physical object and hits our eyes), and eventually we process such perceptions in our brains and work with mental representations — i.e., brain states — of the object in question. But an abstract object can’t be processed like this. It is non-physical, and so, e.g., light can’t reflect off of it. So our usual causal theory of knowledge acquisition fails for things like numbers.
Well, then, how is it that we come across any knowledge of abstract objects, if they indeed exist? Some mathematical platonists, like the venerable logician Kurt Gödel, resorted to the idea that we just know truths about mathematical abstracts. As he wrote:
"But, despite their remoteness from sense experience, we do have a perception also of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don’t see why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e., in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception…"
Worries like this keep nominalists well-motivated to stay on their side of the debate.
"The Sighting" from Existential Comics, parodies the Mathematical Platonists, further explanations at their site.
So do numbers exist or not?
Well, if you’re a platonist, you would answer “yes, numbers exist”. And further you would claim that they possess a sort of existence that is abstract — different from the sort of existence that stones, trees, and quarks enjoy. Of course, this means you are in the unenviable position of explaining the coherence of this sort of existence, along with the herculean task of explaining how we know about anything in this abstract, non-physical realm.
If you’re a nominalist, you’d probably answer “no, numbers do not exist”. However, now you have the unenviable job of explaining why mathematics seems so indispensable to science, while science is perhaps our best tool for saying which things exist. The two best nominalist answers to this conundrum seem untenable.
Well, if you’re a platonist, you would answer “yes, numbers exist”. And further you would claim that they possess a sort of existence that is abstract — different from the sort of existence that stones, trees, and quarks enjoy. Of course, this means you are in the unenviable position of explaining the coherence of this sort of existence, along with the herculean task of explaining how we know about anything in this abstract, non-physical realm.
If you’re a nominalist, you’d probably answer “no, numbers do not exist”. However, now you have the unenviable job of explaining why mathematics seems so indispensable to science, while science is perhaps our best tool for saying which things exist. The two best nominalist answers to this conundrum seem untenable.
Ponder this
So do things exist simply because we have an idea of them? What are the implications on the scientific method, where such hypotheses require evidence and proofs before they are accepted?
Of course, this may be purely the creation of the human mind. How would a scientist dissect this idea? How would he or she disprove it?
Discuss
What other Platonic things do people believe in? Things that are unproven or unprovable. Why do people believe in them? Why should or shouldn't people believe in them?
Further readings
Plato's Theory of Forms, argues that non-physical ideas are the truest form of reality, these includes ideas of "justice" and "beauty".
Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics, at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Nominalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics, at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy